*175 province — who, though considered formidable fighters, had been badly treated and irregularly paid. Their mutiny broke Chin Shu-jen's nerve, and he fled to Russian territory, whence he returned to China. The remaining officials in Urumchi then elected the head of the Education Bureau, Lin Wen-lung, as acting provincial Chairman, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai as acting commander of the military forces.

[701] Ever since the regime of China's first modern war lord, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a provincial governor who does not control his own troops has usually been overshadowed by the commander of the provincial military forces. It was not surprising, therefore, that Sheng Shih-ts'ai soon dominated his nominal civil superior. Sheng was born in Liaoning Province, in the south of Manchuria, and educated partly in Shanghai and Nanking. He went to Japan in 1915 and again in 1925 to study political economy and military science. During his second stay in Japan he was already under the patronage of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1926–1927 he served on the staff of Ho Ying-ch'in, Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek on the "Northern Expedition" which resulted in the capture of Nanking and Shanghai and Chiang's rise to power. At this time it was not sure whether or how the Kuomintang would be able to take over the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), and it was advisable to have in reserve a promising young Northeastern officer. Eventually, however, the Northeastern Provinces came over to the Kuomintang under their own war lord, the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsüeh-liang, which left no room for Northeasterners who did not belong to his personal following. The hopes of Sheng Shih-ts'ai went into eclipse, and for lack of other prospects he went to Sinkiang in 1929 on the personal staff of a bureaucrat who had been appointed General Secretary of the Provincial Government. By 1930 he had worked up to the position of Chief of the General Staff Office of the Frontier Army.

*175 185 As soon as he took over the real power in 1933, Sheng announced an "Eight-point Policy" for Sinkiang, which was to become famous: equality between nationalities; religious freedom; immediate rural relief; financial reform; administrative reform;

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*175 642 determination often stems not from separatism but from resistance to the assertion of a central dictatorship over outlying provinces.

Thus the *New York Times* correspondent Tillman Durdin, in a Mukden dispatch of February 3, 1948, noted that "Perhaps the main cause of bitterness against the government among the Manchurians has been the policy of officials appointed by Nanking of treating the Manchurians as a people to be dominated militarily and exploited economically." The "Manchurians" are, of course, Chinese, closely related to the main stock of North China. The situation in Sinkiang, where most of the people are not Chinese, is similar but more marked. Thus even Masud Sabri, an Uighur who was regarded by other Uighurs as subservient to the C.C. Clique, felt constrained to say in 1945 that while the war against Japan was still going on the main characteristics of Chungking policy in Sinkiang were military domination by a large number of troops who were regarded as "human-faced locusts," and promotion of the kind of Chinese colonization that had contributed so much to such uprisings as that in Komul.[60]

*175 701 When Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang in September 1944 he left behind six divisions of his own troops. In addition, four divisions of Chungking troops had already entered the province. Two divisions of Chinese Moslem cavalry from Ch'inghai were added a year later, bringing the total up to twelve divisions. Strong fortifications facing west were then built, and though there have been a number of reorganizations, the total military force has remained at about 100,000.[61] The economic strain and social friction associated with the maintenance of such a force in a distant and thinly inhabited province have been described by a Chinese

[60] *New York Times*, January 30, 1948. The comment on troops by Masud Sabri is contained in his article "Regarding Politics in the Northwest," in *Altai*, Chungking, April 25, 1945 (in Chinese).

[61] This figure was reported by Frank Robertson, who in 1947 spent about eight months in Sinkiang. See his dispatch of January 28, 1948, published in *New York Times*, February 1, 1948. For military establishment at the time Sheng Shih-ts'ai left Sinkiang, see press interview with Chang Chih-chung published in *Hsinchiang Jih Pao* (*Sinkiang Daily*), Urumchi, July 4, 1947 (in Chinese).

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writer. From Lanchow along the "panhandle" of Kansu, across the main desert gap and on to Urumchi, the distance is nearly 2000 miles. Yet a blockhouse was maintained about every twenty miles along the route. Supplies and transport were kept moving only by heavy requisitions in kind and in labor from the sparse population. The troops, who themselves were not well treated, were not under good discipline, and when turned loose they treated the people even worse.[62]

Chinese colonization has resulted in the addition of very few owner-cultivators. Many famine refugees have died even after their arrival in Sinkiang, and in the cities and towns there has been a great increase in the number of beggars and thieves.[63] Heavy taxation and inflation stimulated bitter hatred against the Chinese, accompanied by much resentment even among Chinese against the political regime. As one American reporter observed, "to save Sinkiang, China would have to make spectacular reforms on a scale unknown in the Orient. But even if this were possible and if it were done, China's efforts might break down against the barrier of emotion"—meaning the aroused nationalism of the Uighurs.[64]

In the rivalry for power in Sinkiang in the last years of Kuomintang rule, the C.C. Clique had the upper hand over the Political Science Group most of the time. It was able to use, in succession, an old-line bureaucrat like Wu Chung-hsin, a general like Chang Chih-chung, and a wealthy Uighur landlord member of the Kuomintang like Masud Sabri.

Wu Chung-hsin, long associated with the C.C. Clique, long active in frontier affairs, and long distrusted by Mongols and Tibetans, was appointed provincial Chairman in October 1944. Though a graduate of the Paoting Military Academy, his most important posts had been in the Civil Service. He was Governor of Anhui, his native province, in 1929, Governor of Kweichow

[62] Chung Shih, "The Puzzle in Sinkiang," in *Min Chu* (*Democracy*, weekly), Shanghai, March 16, 1946, Nos. 21–22 joint issue (in Chinese).

[63] Ch'en Ssu-ying, "Agriculture in Sinkiang," in *Central Bank Monthly*, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 6, Shanghai, June, 1946 (in Chinese).

[64] Frank Robertson.

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Chinese of Sinkiang. "In this province," he declared, "it is impossible to maintain peace by means of persecution, corruption, trickery, and fraud"; but on the other hand "the enemies of our people are not the Chinese nation, but those individuals who advocate oppressive government, who want imperialist policies, who are against rights for the people." [86]

In April 1947 Chang Chih-chung made a tour of the most important oases of the Tarim Basin. In May, fortified presumably by the firsthand knowledge he had acquired, he made an important speech at Urumchi in which he put forward a Chinese policy countering the policy of Akhmedjan. There should, he pleaded, be no resort to revolution. Theoretically, Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic system of rule; but autonomy and democracy should be based on a choice between the Sun Yat-sen pattern and the Soviet pattern. The Kulja group, he asserted, because of its opposition to the Chinese Government, must be regarded as opposing the San Min Chu I or Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen, and must therefore be pro-Communist.

General Chang also dealt with a number of the substantive issues standing between the Chinese Government and the Kulja group. Akhmedjan, as the spokesman of the Kulja group, was willing to recognize the right of the Chinese Government to control the national defense of Sinkiang. General Chang, however, contended that reorganization of the six regiments in the three frontier regions of Kulja, Chuguchak, and the Altai district should be preceded by the complete surrender of those regiments to the Chinese forces. His demand in this respect was parallel to that of the Chinese Government in its 1945–1946 negotiations with the Chinese Communists, through the Marshall Mission: the Communists offered to reduce their forces and to place them under a united high command, but demanded that their identity as units be preserved and that the units continue to be stationed in Communist districts; the National Government insisted on its right not only to take over such forces but to disperse or reassign them.

[86] Akhmedjan, in the speech cited above.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1
Chinese

*563 578 669 Uighurs were regarded as only political rebels. When they defeated Chinese Moslems, however, they massacred women and children as well as men, because these communities were regarded as not only political rebels but traitors to the Chinese blood.

*563 ● 701 668 Since the end of the war against Japan the Chinese reinforcements sent to Sinkiang have been principally non-Moslem troops of the National Government, though crack Moslem cavalry have been stationed on the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic in the disputed Baitik Bogda area. The great Moslem war lords of Northwest China have been fully engaged in the militarily difficult and politically delicate dual operation of preventing the Chinese Communists from expanding into their satrapies, while at the same time consolidating in those satrapies an autonomous power sufficiently strong to refuse to allow the National Government either to send in garrisons or to collect taxes. They have had no forces to spare for independent adventures in Sinkiang. In compensation the National Government, while losing authority over the Moslems of Northwest China, gained the upper hand over them in Sinkiang. Playing on the social conservatism of the Chinese Moslems, they were for a time at least able to align them against Turkic nationalism and still more against the more revolutionary "coalition nationalism" of the Kulja movement.

x563 701 648 Backed by over 100,000 National Government troops with relatively good training and American equipment, and with the Moslem Chinese unable to dispute the ascendancy of the non-Moslems, the position of the Chinese as a whole in Sinkiang, in the last years of Kuomintang rule, was curious. Their troops gave them formidable striking power against an insurrection at almost any one point, but not the decisive power to crush, as a whole, the nationalism which increasingly pervaded the entire province. Political and military decisions lay in the hands of high Chinese officials almost none of whom were natives of the province. As individuals, they were not engaged in the defense of old vested interests but, all too often, in the acquisition of new personal interests.

3: Skrine G-3 (1922-1924) 1926 AII Sinkiang AII

10th March.

The new Commandant of the Yarkand garrison is of a type that is new to me, for unlike all the officials I have met hitherto he is a native of Sinkiang, though pure Chinese. His forebears, he tells me, have been in the military service of the Urumchi Government for six generations, i.e. ever since the last reconquest but one, in 1758. Incidentally, he is about as un-martial-looking a person as can be imagined; but he has had quite a varied and interesting career none the less. He has been to Manchuria and Moscow; he has been on expeditions against brigands in wild Kansu; he was once staff officer to a general who was banished to Sinkiang for implication in the Boxer rising. But perhaps his most unusual job was when he and two other "wei-yuans" (officers on special duty) were detailed to take 500 Kalmuck horses from Urumchi to Peking as a present to the great Yuan Shih-kai. I asked him whether the whole number arrived safely after the 2,000-mile journey, mostly across the desert? "Oh, we lost a lot," he replied, "but we had a big margin and delivered the 500 all right." I thought of the Hami melons they used to send to the Emperors, and reflected how the methods of the Chinese resemble natural processes in their disregard of waste.

11th March.

Last night the missionaries and ourselves were the guests of ex-Taoyin 'Chu' at a Chinese dinner-and-theatre party at the Tientsin merchants' club. In China you do not go to the theatre after dinner, as we do; the theatre comes to you during it. A large courtyard had been roofed over with cloth for the occasion; on one side was a temporary stage, on the other a dinner-table set for about twenty persons. The place was filled to overflowing with hordes of Chinese attendants, clerks, interpreters, soldiers, policemen and bottlewashers of all kinds, behind whom crowded Turki hangers-on, street-urchins and other sight-seers. Several delicious children of Chinese guests were present; the prettiest was an exquisitely made-up little girl dressed in embroidered red silk with a wonderful ornament in her hair consisting of a butterfly in jewelled enamel and bright green Yunnan jade, with a quivering aigrette of fine gold wire spraying downwards from it. There was also a tiny boy dressed like a miniature mandarin in a fur-lined black satin jacket and black silk skirt, surmounted by an absurd green Homburg hat, who planted himself solidly in the middle of the narrow open space between our table and the stage and stared solemnly at the players for a long time. His back view was that of an exceptionally fat Amban about two feet high, one of the funniest sights I have seen for a long time.

For nearly six hours we sat at the big table while course after course of a full-length Chinese dinner came and went, and a travelling company of Chihli actors performed play after play opposite us. Except for its inordinate length, the entertainment was quite an enjoyable one, and most interesting. On the Chinese stage all the parts are taken by males; the characters speak in a curious and very ugly kind of falsetto sing-song, the voices of the "actresses" differing from those of the actors only in being shriller and more strident. In the classical plays, which form the majority of the repertoire, the chief

LABOR

I. "Free Labor

Information on labor conditions in the Northwest is very scanty. However, there are indications that the Communists have faced a very serious problem of labor shortage in that area. To begin with, the Northwest is a very sparsely populated area. It embraces about one third of China's territory, but its population is only about six percent of the national total. If any large scale reconstruction works are to be effected, it seems to be necessary to use outside labor supplies. Moreover, educational standards in the Northwest have been relatively low. Consequently, the quality of native labor is also a problem.

To overcome these difficulties, the Communists have adopted several methods. One is to encourage or force skilled and semi-skilled labor in other parts of the country to work in the Northwest. For instance, the communication department of Sinkiang in May, 1955, absorbed some 409 automobile drivers and mechanics from among the demobilized servicemen in Shantung and Honan for reconstruction work in the border regions. In March, 1955, 200 cadres of Hui nationality of the People's Liberation Army Railway Corps have been transfered to work in the Hui-nationality areas in Kansu and Chinghai. Most of these cadres have passed through the Anti-Japanese "War of Liberation," land reform and Anti-U.S. and Aid-Korea campaigns. Of these ninety percent are party members or members of the Communist Youth League.

In late 1954, four thousand skilled building workers and technicians from other cities have signed up for work in Sian. They began to arrive from Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton and other places in early 1955, and they were warmly welcomed by the local authorities. All this shows that outside labor has played a very important part in the economic reconstruction in the Northwest (See also section Population).

II. Army Labor

Another method is to use the army as a labor force. This has been particularly important in Sinkiang, in which the People's Liberation Army have participated in many reconstruction projects. To take 1955 as an example, they were engaged in the following tasks:

A March 24, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liberation Army farming units in Sinkiang have started their afforestation program in the south of this province. This year they plan to plant trees on 1,200 hectares, mostly shelter belts to protect reclaimed farmland."

464 An April 18, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liber-
701 ation Army in Sinkiang has started spring sowing on the plains
708 north and south of the T'ien-shan Mountains. Crops already
668 sown include spring wheat, oil-bearing plants and long
177 staple cotton. The army men are experimenting with the
241 cultivation of long staple cotton in the Turfan Basin, where favorable conditions exist. This year the PLA farming units will cultivate over 66,000 hectares, or thirteen percent more than last year. More than half of the land will be ploughed by tractors. Adequate supplies of chemical fertilizer and insecticides are on hand."

708 A June 3, 1955, despatch reports: "The largest reservoir
653 in Sinkiang is being enlarged this month by engineering units
312 of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Sinkiang. When
668 completed, the Men-chin reservoir, north of Urumchi, will
177 have a storage capacity of sixty million cubic meters of water
503 which can be used for irrigation."

464 An October 31, 1955 despatch reports: "A leading part has been played by the People's Liberation Army in irrigation works in Sinkiang. With their help, the peasants have constructed nine reservoirs, repaired irrigation canals and ditches, totalling 30,000 kilometers in length, built hundreds of new canals and added more subterranean waterways, a form of irrigation traditionally used in the region. In addition, the People's Liberation Army units have built and expanded works capable of irrigating 200,000 hectares, mostly farmed by local peasants. The army men also reclaimed over 73,000 hectares of wasteland and set up twenty-nine mechanized state farms."

708 A November 3, 1955, despatch reports: "Manass Basin
241 Agricultural Production Construction Troops of Sinkiang Military
668 District of the People's Liberation Army plan to grow cotton in
177 an area of 202,000 mou next year, one hundred forty-six percent
464 larger than this year. These troops are now actively undertaking
[248] the preparatory works."

A December 24, 1955, despatch reports: "A new mechanized farm has been built in the Manass Basin by PLA. It has some 10,000 hectares of well irrigated farmland, part of which has already been sown in winter wheat. They plan to supply the state with nine thousand tons of grain and twenty-eight hundred tons of cotton next year."

701 The constitution of the so-called People's Liberation Army
708 in Sinkiang has not been disclosed. But to use the regular army
464 as a labor force in peace time is, to say the least, forced labor
466 in disguise. (See section Forced Labor of General Handbook).
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III. Conscript Labor

These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an unjustified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living, internal and external, changed very little. Their families constituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this structural organization, there existed the military institutions of banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect and found them to be submissive followers.

In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts) populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their livestock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of a widespread educational system might be another asset for the Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes literature written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure, are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also IMAR Handbook, same section).

III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans

An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among

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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Introduction

A. Historical Administration of Area

1. Ch'ing Dynasty

During the Ch'ing dynasty, Shensi and Kansu were two of the eighteen provinces which formed China proper. The police system and the problems of public order and safety were similar to those of the other provinces. (See Section on Public Order and Safety in General Handbook.) However, in the Chinghai area, the maintenance of order was mainly entrusted to the native local chiefs. In Sinkiang, a network of military garrisons under the rule of Manchu military officers was established. Its main purpose was to suppress possible rebellions by the minority groups. The daily administration and maintenance of order among the minorities at the lower local level, however, here also rested with the minority chiefs and local leaders. The efficiency of this system is illustrated by the record of the riots. Periodically, at intervals of roughly thirty to fifty years, a major rebellion broke out. Numerous small riots occurred between the big conflicts. As a whole, however, the Ch'ing dynasty's maintenance of public order in the northwest was considered to be successful.

2. Post 1911

When the revolution came in 1911, the situations varied in the different provinces. The weakness of the central government in Peking helped further the development of local forces. In Shensi, Kansu (and Ninghsia) and Ch'inghai, there were various warlords who occupied and dominated a certain portion of the land at various times. The purpose of the police forces under the warlords was to maintain their dominant position. Their police forces were efficient or less so, depending on the personalities of the leaders. Often they were backward and cruel, but usually they followed the traditional pattern of the Chinese bureaucracy. Most of the warlords adopted the "closed-door" policy. Outsiders, especially those viewed as potential trouble-makers, were not too free to travel around. This simplified police work since the local population was comparatively less educated and, except for the Moslems, more submissive than the outsiders.

In Sinkiang, the situation was complicated by two factors. First, it was exposed to foreign agitation, particularly from Russia and Great Britain. Second, it had a mixed population with the Chinese in the minority. Therefore, the purpose and mission of the police forces in Sinkiang were traditionally difficult. Maintaining the leader's power involved dealing with foreign influences and with the various local peoples. These constant challenges made the police forces in Sinkiang more alert and efficient than in other

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648 Turkestan resources by proposing an open trade agreement in November 1946 remained unanswered by the Soviets.

The Chinese attempt to regain control by Chang Chih-chung's policy of negotiation was based on military measures aimed at strengthening the strategic position. Along the whole route from Lanchow to Urumchi, blockhouses were maintained at distances of about twenty miles. And at the same time a new effort was made to open up the route from Ching-hai. The new Moslem governor of the province, Ma Pu-fang, received Nationalist support in his [491] efforts to build a road from Sining along Lake Kokonor towards the Tarim Basin. This road had been driven well past the Kokonor before the Communist victory in 1949. The National Government [701] had also strengthened the military force in Sinkiang. In addition to the six divisions which Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai had left behin, four divisions of Nationalist troops had been sent to the province and two divisions of Ma Pu-fang's cavalry from Chinghai had also been brought in, bringing the total of Chinese forces up to twelve divisions, or about 100,000 men, which have remained there since the Communists took over.

In spite of this military force, Governor Chang Chih-chung did not succeed in transforming the agreements concluded with the Kulja group in 1946 into a working arrangement. He demanded that the reorganization of the forces of the Kulja area should be preceded by acceptance of Chinese control. He also wanted the approval of the Sinkiang Nationalist leaders for the railroad to be built from China into Sinkiang and the acceptance by Sinkiang of the Chinese Nationalist currency. The Sinkiang Nationalist leaders refused these conditions, and in May 1947, Chang Chih-chung resigned as governor and was succeeded by an Uighur, Masud Sabri, who was a compromise candidate acceptable to the Chinese National Government. In July 1947 the Kulja nationalists broke with Masud [669] Sabri and maintained their own autonomous administration under Akmedjan. The situation remained in a deadlock and the Kulja group was reportedly receiving aid for its troops from Soviet Russia. The Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, who had formerly joined the Kulja group, had broken with it on account of the Soviet support and had withdrawn with his own forces to the Altai border region.

To overcome the deadlock with the Turkic Nationalists, the National government agreed in December 1949 to the appointment of one of the Nationalist leaders as governor of the province. This was Burkhan who was by origin a Russian Tatar and a man with whom the Kazakh nationalists were willing to cooperate. In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung flew once more to Sinkiang to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty. But all these moves by the National Government to appease Soviet Russia by economic concessions and to appease theRussian-supported Kulja Nationalists

000 one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

S
159 T'ao Ch'ih-yueh: Army officer
631 A native of Hunan, dates unknown. Graduate of Whampao
701 Military Academy; 1936, commanding officer of the Eighth Division, Nationalist Army; 1945-49, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison; 1949-, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the Sinkiang Military Area, and commanding officer of the 22nd Army Group; 1949-, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and member of the Government Council of the People's Government of Sinkiang; 1951-, member of the National Committee, People's Political Consultative Conference; 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council.

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159 During the Nationalist administration, T'ao was never in a
701 very important position in the army. His rise to fame began when General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Nationalist Government, conducted peace talks with the local leaders of Sinkiang from 1946-1949. At this time T'ao, succeeding General Sung Hsi-lien, became the commander of the garrison forces in

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159 Sinkiang. When the defense of the Northwest by the Nationalist
669 troops was broken down by the victorious Communist army,
668 T'ao took the lead of all military and political leaders of Sinkiang to switch his allegiance and support to the Communist regime in Peking. On September 26, 1949, he made his public announcement in which he separated Sinkiang's relationship from the Nationalist regime and gave his whole support to the Peking regime. And on October 1, 1949, he went to Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu, to welcome the commanding officer of the People's Liberation Army, General Wang Chen, to Sinkiang. His troops were then reorganized into the 22nd Army Group, which he still commands, but which was later disarmed and transformed into "production corps." T'ao was elected to the CPPCC in 1951. He was a member of the NW MAC (later the Northwest Administrative Council) and in 1955, a member of the National Defense Council.

N Teng Pao-san: Army officer
159 A native of Kansu Province; dates unknown. 1927, deputy
*668 commander-in-chief of the Preparatory Army for National Con-
701 struction under the command of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General. 1930, deputy commissioner in the Pacification Headquarters of Shensi Province. 1937, deputy commander of Suiyuan War Area under General Fu Tso-i, stationed in Paotou, Suiyuan; 1948, 1949, during the Communist advance in 1949 he gave up his city and fled. Later he defected from the Nationalists. Delegate to the CPPCC; appointed chairman in the People's Government of Kansu Province and re-elected to the same

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631 **Yang Tzu-lien:** Democratic League member, government official

A native of Shensi Province, dates unknown; member of the Northwest Headquarters of the Democratic League; 1950-1953, member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, chairman of the Political and Legal Committee, and director of the Board of Justice in that council. Since 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the Political and Legal Committee; since 1951, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League.

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• 701
631 **Yolbash (Yolbars) Khan:** Anti-Communist army officer and government official
Chinese name: Ching-fu

A Uighur, born in 1888 (or 1883) in Yingihissar in Kashgar. Orphaned as a child and reared by his elder sister. 1904, entered the service of the King of Qomul (Hami) as an inspector of the fifth rank; 1911, delegate to the Qomul City Assembly; 1922, promoted to a beg of the third rank; 1927, commissioner of communications in Qomul; 1930, general of the second rank (erh-p'in Ta Tu-t'ung); 1932, member of the Provincial Assembly; 1933, brigadier commander of mounted troops; 1935, magistrate of Qomul and garrison commander of Qomul; 1937, compelled to leave Sinkiang because of his anti-Soviet views; made lieutenant general and a member of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government; 1938, went to Chungking, became military councillor in the Administrative headquarters (hsing-ying); member of the board of directors of the Islamic National Salvation Association; 1945, member of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang; 1946, attended the People's Political Consultative Conference at Nanking; returned to Sinkiang as advisor to the Sinkiang Provincial Government; elected special commissioner for the Ninth District. Concurrently appointed advisor to the National Government; 1947, Administrative Supervisory Commissioner in the Qomul district; commander of peace preservation forces in the Qomul district; 1948, advisor on National policies in the office of the President in the National Government; 1949, deputy commander of the Peace Preservation Forces; 1950, commander in chief of the guerrilla forces in Sinkiang resisting the Communists; April 1950, Nationalist Government-appointed governor of Sinkiang; 1951, fled from Sinkiang to Formosa. Now advisor on national policies in the office of the President, National Government on Formosa.

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242 The Soviet Union sent
668 thirty-three airplanes and large numbers of locust experts to
433 spray insecticides over an area of some 2,669,000 mow (or
[177] 405,688 acres) during 1952-1955. On the state farms, the Army
[475] has done the lion's share of the work of reclaiming land, building
[701] irrigation works, erecting experimental farms and stations and operating them. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955. p. 7, No. 9.)

654 The Communists reported that they have given financial and
668 technical assistance to the various nationalities who till the soil
241 or engage in pastoral activities. By the end of 1954, agricultural
175 loans totalling some 26,140,000 yuan (U.S. $1,061) and some 46,000 farming implements had been supplied to the peasants, enabling every peasant household to have one trowel of its own and every 1.3 households to own a plow. These small figures indicate that assistance has been meagre; but even this might enable the peasants to increase output as compared to output obtained by previous farming implements.

241 Whether agriculture will prosper in Sinkiang depends entirely
312 on the steps taken in water conservancy and the proper utilization
668 of water. Already five million additional mow of land (160,000
175 acres) have been irrigated in the past six years and the irrigated acreage in 1954 has been increased by 30.2 per cent since 1949. Reservoirs have been constructed like the well-known "Red Wild Goose Reservoir" and the "Peace Reservoir" which both now irrigate more than 237,000 mow (36,024 acres of land). Three
[475] state farms, collective farms, and a dozen or so agricultural co-
[474] ops have been formed in the area.

231 By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in the whole
433 province numbered 17,105,000 head, an increase of 7.47 per cent
175 over 1953. (In 1947 the total number of livestock was 15,037,000.
668 The figure reported for 1954 indicates a 13 per cent increase.) The plan for 1955 is to raise the number fo 18,987,567 head, a net increase of 11 per cent. This will include 537,280 head of large and small animals of improved breed (including 515,792 sheep, 7,930 large domestic animals, 13,538 pigs); 2,839,140 head of livestock will be innoculated against or cured of various diseases. The Chinese Communists complain, however, of many defects in animal husbandry. During the past winters, insufficient feed was gathered and many animals died. It was estimated that some 200,000 died in the spring of 1954, an approximate loss of one per cent per annum.

313 The forestry policy has been to protect existent forests from
668 fire and damage, to survey forest areas suitable for afforestation, to plant saplings there, and to afforestate areas near rural villages for the development of co-ops and state farms. Each year, the quota mou to be afforestated is set and state departments undertake to meet these quotas. Nurseries have been built and seedlings planted in these tracts.